According to Elliptic, launderers connected to North Korea have utilized throwaway memecoins to transfer approximately $430,000 derived from the $6.4 billion Binance hack via decentralized exchange pools. These operators established six distinct NEAR tokens and channeled illicit funds through their proprietary liquidity pools, a method that Elliptic notes can mimic trading proceeds even though the underlying transactions remain traceable.
Investigators have monitored this laundering activity across more than 20,000 wallets spanning 16 different blockchains. Since Nov. 8, Tornado Cash has accumulated roughly 7,000 ETH associated with the theft. In a report published on Nov. 9 by Tom Robinson, Elliptic stated that the operators minted six specific tokens—FUK, OLCCL, MEILI, MMLI, DABI, and SINU—between Nov. 5 and 7, with each token costing around 25 NEAR or approximately $90 to create.
Laundering Tactics via Memecoins and Liquidity Pools
According to a report by Tom Robinson for Elliptic published on November 9, operators routed approximately 117,000 stolen NEAR tokens through separate trading pools where they had paired their minted memecoins with the asset. This laundering method involved distinct groups of wallets within Robinson's account analysis; one group purchased the newly created tokens using illicit cryptocurrency while another sold them into the same liquidity pool to collect real assets without direct fund transfers between the buying and selling entities.
This method existed before the recent theft, a pattern Elliptic spotted after the 2025 Bybit incident. Although destination accounts might look like legitimate traders cashing out, Robinson cautioned compliance units against believing funds are safe just because they enter a liquidity pool. The analysis stated that investigators remain able to trace the path on-chain, noting that this approach serves to stall inquiries while inexpensive tokens are thrown away once utilized.
According to Elliptic's distinct laundering monitoring tool, which recorded updates on November 9 at 13:15 UTC, a specific campaign engaged over 20,000 wallets distributed across 16 different blockchains. This activity involved a minimum of 36 services and totaled approximately 65,000 transactions. Beginning November 8, funds connected to the heist moved roughly 7,000 ETH, equivalent to $15 million, into Tornado Cash. Certain of these deposits originated from bitcoin that had previously undergone coinjoin mixing before reverting to an ETH form.
Within this broader operation, approximately 3,000 BTC, representing a value of $225 million, gathered in fresh addresses following conversions of other illicit assets. Meanwhile, the primary holdings of Bitcoin and Ether stayed put as noted by the tracking system. The tracker indicated that roughly $3 billion persisted within addresses tied to the theft, with $2.85 billion of that sum frozen. Consequently, Elliptic concluded that only a minimal quantity had probably been withdrawn for cashing out.
On October 31, the FBI identified TraderTraitor as responsible for the theft, leading the tracker to call on platforms such as THORChain operators to halt associated transfers. By November 3, Binance detailed an intrusion spanning several months that utilized developer tools, deceptive hiring processes, and entry into internal networks.
The exchange noted that in June, a compromised Homebrew setup revealed the involvement of an engineer and their associates. Later, during interviews in September, a candidate downloaded a project repository to a workstation; Binance stated that harmful code substituted a valid utility and bypassed endpoint protections.
On October 20, an attacker exploited a compromised computer and an internal artificial intelligence utility to infiltrate the machines of two wallet engineers, subsequently using stolen container deployment credentials to gain access to wallet signing operations. The exchange assessed the total impact of this breach at $6.34 billion and confirmed that it had reserved funds exceeding the full amount necessary to cover the losses.
Separate technical analysis revealed that malicious EIP-7702 permissions allowed an Ethereum wallet to run code controlled by the attacker, with Blockaid identifying 50 authorizations submitted within a single transaction where one successfully aligned with the Binance 14 wallet's transaction counter. Because the wallet remained active in processing withdrawals, its counter value shifted continuously; however, the authorizations encompassed consecutive counter values, providing the attacker with multiple opportunities to match the required value at the moment of execution.
Binance's initial probe indicated no sign of a leaked wallet private key, while recovery operations encompassed a Nov. 5 appeal to retrieve immobilized holdings totaling 8,425.997 ETH and 74.56 million ARB held on Arbitrum.
Scope of the Theft and Frozen Holdings
The Security Council briefly elevated a contract to shift funds into a frozen location before reinstating the prior setup, observing that further movement of these balances demands DAO consent. Binance suggested utilizing this temporary upgrade to return current frozen assets without requesting new treasury funds, with recovered sums potentially offsetting incident expenses and refilling reserves previously deployed for customer compensation.
Binance suggested implementing a short-term contract modification to restore previously frozen funds without asking for additional treasury capital, projecting that the entire cycle of debate, voting, and implementation would span at least seven weeks. The timeline outlined one week for community forum deliberation, followed by a week dedicated to assessing sentiment, then a two-week period for on-chain voting, and approximately 18 more days before execution once approval was secured, with the recovered money expected to help pay incident costs and refill reserves already spent on customer payouts.